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H I G H L I G H T S
! The many non-Darwinian theories of complexity in evolution are briefly reviewed.
! We offer a Darwinian, “economic” theory that differs from gene focused approaches.
! We posit that synergy of various kinds has played a major causal role in evolution.
! This dynamic can be framed and modeled using the concept of synergistic selection.
! The growing interest in synergy and synergistic selection is briefly surveyed.
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a b s t r a c t
Non-Darwinian theories of the emergence and evolution of complexity date back at least to Lamarck,
and include those of Herbert Spencer and the “emergent evolution” theorists of the later nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. In recent decades, this approach has mostly been espoused by various
practitioners in biophysics and complexity theory. However, there is a Darwinian alternative – in
essence, an economic theory of complexity – proposing that synergistic effects of various kinds have
played an important causal role in the evolution of complexity, especially in the “major transitions”. We
call this theory the “synergism hypothesis”. We posit that otherwise unattainable functional advantages
arising from various cooperative phenomena have been favored over time in a dynamic that the late John
Maynard Smith characterized and modeled as “synergistic selection”. The term highlights the fact that
synergistic “wholes” may become interdependent “units” of selection. We provide some historical
perspective on this issue, as well as a brief explication of the underlying theory and the concept of
synergistic selection, and describe two relevant models.
& 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
“The whole is something over and above its parts, and not just
the sum of them all…”
—Aristotle, Metaphysics (Book H, 1045:8-10)
1. Introduction
The emergence and evolution of biological complexity over
time has been a subject of speculation, theorizing, and debate for
many centuries, but the predominant approach until very recently
has been non-Darwinian1. Over the years, there have been a great
variety of deterministic, orthogenetic, vitalistic, and otherwise
“pre-programmed” theories. However, evolutionary biologists
have recently begun to devote more attention to the problem of
explaining this important aspect of the evolutionary process, with
particular attention to the “major transitions” that have resulted in
emergent new levels of biological organization.
Inclusive fitness, or kin selection theory, represents one path-
way to solving this theoretical puzzle, but it is increasingly evident
that this paradigm, while useful, is insufficient to account fully for
the wide variety of cooperative phenomena in the natural world,
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1 An anonymous reviewer reminded us of the pioneering but eccentric books on
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including especially biological complexity, and the roles of both
cooperation and mutualism (see Leigh, 2010a, 2010b). Here we
will describe an alternative approach that could be characterized
as an economic theory of cooperation and complexity, a theory
that is compatible with both kin selection and multi-level selec-
tion theory.
What we call the “synergism hypothesis,” and the closely
related concept of “synergistic selection,” involves a theoretical
frame shift. The theory proposes that cooperative functional effects
(synergies) of various kinds have provided selective advantages
over time that has driven the evolution of complexity; the theory
is concerned with the benefits and costs of various forms of
cooperation. This theory is analogous to kin selection theory –
and indeed to the concept of natural selection itself – in that it
identifies an open-ended class of phenomena with common
properties (functional synergies) that are said to have had causal
significance in relation to an important aspect of evolution.
However, there are many other influences at work as well. So
kin selection, multi-level selection, mutualism, and synergistic
selection are not mutually exclusive; they could well be comple-
mentary. Synergies produce combined effects that can render
multi-level selection more potent. We begin with a brief review
of the literature in complexity theory over the years.
2. Complexity theory, before and after Darwin
Perhaps the earliest “modern” theorist to advance the idea of
an inherent evolutionary trend toward complexity was the eight-
eenth and early nineteenth century naturalist Lamarck (1914/
1809), although the basic idea can be traced back at least to
Aristotle’s concept of “entelechy”2. A half century later, the
renowned English polymath Spencer (1892/1852) elevated the
idea of progress into an energy-centered “universal law of evolu-
tion” that spanned physics, biology, psychology, sociology and
ethics3.
Darwin was deeply opposed to such formulations, needless to
say. He may have been directly rebutting Lamarck and Spencer,
among others, when he wrote in The Origin of Species, “I believe in
no fixed law of development” (Darwin, 1968/1859, p. 318). And
again, “I believe … in no necessary law of development” (p. 348).
However, Darwin never specifically addressed the evolution of
complexity as such, nor even (more notoriously) the origin of
species, although of course he was fascinated by the origin of
complex adaptations, such as the eye, and suggested how they
might evolve. Many generations of biology students have learned
that Darwin was a convinced gradualist who frequently quoted the
popular canon of his day, natura non facit saltum—nature does not
make leaps. (The phrase appears no less than five times in The
Origin of Species)4.
2.1. Emergent evolution
Many theorists of the post-Darwinian era viewed Darwin’s
theory as unsatisfactory, or at least incomplete, and, in the early
twentieth century, the so-called theory of emergent evolution was
advanced as a way to reconcile Darwin’s gradualism with the
appearance of “qualitative novelties” and, equally important, with
the widespread perception of a long-term trend in evolution
toward new levels of organization and complexity, culminating
(it was believed) in the human mind. Emergent evolution theory
had several prominent adherents, but the leading figure in this
school was the comparative psychologist and prolific writer,
Conwy Lloyd Morgan, who ultimately published three volumes
on the subject, Emergent Evolution (Lloyd Morgan, 1923), Life, Mind,
and Spirit (Lloyd Morgan, 1926) and The Emergence of Novelty
(Lloyd Morgan, 1933). (Other theorists in this vein included
Samuel Alexander, Roy Wood Sellars, C.D. Broad, Arthur Lovejoy,
and Jan Smuts, a one-time Prime Minister of South Africa)5.
Emergent evolution theory represented a grand vision, but it
was not an explanatory theory in the modern, scientific sense.
Indeed, Lloyd Morgan, like many other theorists of his day,
ultimately embraced a metaphysical teleology that portrayed the
evolutionary process as an unfolding of inherent tendencies,
which he associated with a creative divinity. (For a history of
emergence theory, see Blitz, 1992.) But far more damaging to the
concept of emergent evolution was the rise of the science of
genetics in the 1920s and 1930s, along with the seminal theore-
tical work of Ronald Fisher, J.B.S. Haldane, Sewall Wright and
others, and the triumph of the analytical, experimental method in
biology6 . Ever since the emergence of the so-called “modern
synthesis” in the 1930s, evolutionary theory has been (predomi-
nantly) gene-centered and individual or kin selection-oriented.
Indeed, in the wake of the discovery of the double helix and the
genetic code, a gene-centered approach, generally referred to as
“neo-Darwinism,” came to be widely accepted as the foundation of
evolutionary theory. For many years, biological complexity was
mostly treated as a non-problem, or an epiphenomenon, with
some important exceptions (see below).
2.2. The emergence of complexity theory
The re-emergence of emergence and complexity as mainstream
theoretical concerns in the latter part of the twentieth century
roughly coincided with the development of new, non-linear
mathematical tools – particularly chaos theory and dynamical
systems theory – which allowed theorists to model the interac-
tions within complex, dynamic systems in new and insightful
ways. Among other things, complexity theory gave mathematical
legitimacy to the idea that processes involving the interactions
among many parts may be at once deterministic yet for various
reasons unpredictable.
However, the rise of complexity theory also spawned a new
generation of non-Darwinian theorists. For instance, the computer
scientist and algorithm pioneer John Holland, in his 1998 book
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2 In his Zoological Philosophy (1914/1809), Lamarck spoke of an innate develop-
mental energy in evolution – a “power of life” – which he likened to a watch spring
(p. 292).
3
“From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of
civilization,” Spencer wrote, “we shall find that the transformation of the homo-
geneous into the heterogeneous is that in which progress essentially consists”
(Spencer, 1892/1852, I: p. 10).
4 Indeed, Darwin rejected the very idea of sharp discontinuities in nature. In The
Origin he emphasized what he called the “Law of Continuity,” and he repeatedly
stressed the incremental nature of evolutionary change, which he termed “descent
with modification.”
5 The main tenets of Lloyd Morgan’s paradigmwill sound familiar to modern-day
complexity theorists: quantitative, incremental changes can lead to qualitative
changes that are different from, and irreducible to, their parts. By their very nature,
moreover, the properties of such new “wholes” are unpredictable. Though higher-
level, emergent phenomena may arise from lower-level parts, there may also be
“return action,” or what Lloyd Morgan termed “supervenience” (“downward
causation” in today’s parlance). But most important, Lloyd Morgan argued that
the evolutionary process has an underlying “progressive” tendency, because
emergent phenomena lead in due course to new levels of reality.
6 In its most strident form, reductionism swept aside the basic claim of emergent
evolutionists that wholes have irreducible properties that cannot be fully under-
stood or predicted by examining the parts alone. Critics like Stephen C. Pepper,
Charles Baylis, William McDougall, Rudolph Carnap and Bertrand Russell claimed
that emergent qualities were merely epiphenomena and of no scientific signifi-
cance. Russell, for instance, argued that analysis “enables us to arrive at a structure
such that the properties of the complex can be inferred from those of the parts”
(Russell, 1927, pp. 285–286).
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Emergence (Holland, 1998), asked: “How do living systems emerge
from the laws of physics and chemistry…Can we explain con-
sciousness as an emergent property of certain kinds of physical
systems?”(p. 2). Elsewhere in the book Holland spoke of his quest
for what amounts to the antithesis of the entropy law (the Second
Law of Thermodynamics)—namely, an inherent tendency of matter
to organize itself. Holland (1998) illustrated with a metaphor from
chess. Chess, he said, is a game in which “a small number of rules
or laws can generate surprising complexity” (p. 3). He suggested
that biological complexity arises from a similar body of (still
hidden) simple rules.
The well-known theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman in his
early writings also aspired to the discovery of the underlying laws
of evolution. In his 1995 book, At Home in the Universe, Kauffman
(1995) asserted that “order is not accidental, that vast veins of
order lie at hand. Laws of complexity spontaneously generate
much of the order of the natural world….Order, vast and gen-
erative, arises naturally” (pp. 8, 25). He called it “order for free.” In
a later book, Kauffman (2000), p. 5, like Holland, also specu-
lated about a possible “fourth law of thermodynamics,” an inhe-
rent, energy-driven tendency in nature toward greater diversity.
(It should be noted, however, that, in his more recent (Kauffman,
2008) book, his views have evolved; he now fully embraces the
Darwinian paradigm.)
There have been many other variations on the non-Darwinian
theme in recent years, with numerous theorists invoking inherent
self-organizing tendencies in nature. Francis Heylighen et al.
(1999) claimed that evolution leads to the “spontaneous emer-
gence” of systems with higher orders of complexity. Buchanan
(2000) discerned a “law of universality” in evolution – from our
cosmic origins to economic societies – as a consequence of the
phenomenon of “self-organized criticality” as proposed by Bak and
Chen (1991). Grand (2001) viewed the emergence of networks in
nature as a self-propelled, autocatalytic process. Barabási (2002)
invoked “far reaching natural laws” that, he believes, govern the
emergence of networks. Gregerson (2002) saw an “innate sponta-
neity” in the emergence of complexity. A similar argument can be
found in the book by McShea, Brandon (2010). They posit a “first
law’ of biology—an inherent tendency in evolution for living
systems to diversify and become more complex over time, unless
constrained by natural selection. (See also the critical review by
Bromham, 2011.)
Biophysicist Morowitz (2002) comes somewhat closer than
most theorists of this school to a view that is compatible with
the Darwinian paradigm. Recognizing that variability is inhe-
rent in the living world at every level, Morowitz posits that there
are “pruning rules” that shape the forms that arise out of the
many possibilities in evolution (p. 55). However, Morowitz did
not specify what these pruning rules are (perhaps he meant
natural selection) and finds himself in sympathy with the
anthropologist/priest Teilhard de Chardin (and others) in believ-
ing that there is “something deeper” in the “orderly unfolding”
of the universe.
Finally, the emeritus biologist Robert G.B. Reid, in his book
Biological Emergences: Evolution by Natural Experiment (Reid, 2007)
claims that emergent complexity in evolution has been the result
of an autonomous physiological experiment and that natural
selection has played no significant role. In fact, Reid argues, it
has often been a hindrance. He claims that freedom from ecolo-
gical competition and natural selection has been an important
facilitator of emergent evolution, and that the contribution of
natural selection to the history of life on Earth has been confined
at best to “fine-tuning” and “stabilizing” the innovations that arise
from what he characterizes as an internally guided process. Once
basic organismal integrity and homeostatic capabilities evolved,
Reid says, evolution could go forward as an independent process
subject only to the “obstructionism” of natural selection. As Reid
puts it, Darwin got it “fundamentally wrong” (p. xiii)7.
3. Darwinian approaches to complexity
All of these non-Darwinian theories can be called reductionist
in the sense that they rely on some underlying, inherent force,
agency, tendency, or “law” (or in Reid’s case an autonomous
process) that is said to determine the course of the evolution, or
at least shape the evolution of complexity, independently of
natural selection. In effect, these theorists explain away the very
thing that needs to be explained—namely, the contingent nature of
living systems and their fundamentally functional, adaptive prop-
erties. These theorists often seem oblivious to the inescapable
challenges associated with what Darwin called the “struggle for
existence” and they discount the bioeconomics—the costs and
benefits of complexity. (For an extended discussion of this issue,
see Keller, 2007.)
As Egbert Leigh (personal communication) has pointed out,
Darwinian approaches to cooperation and complexity also have a
deep tradition, although they have been less visible until quite
recently. Darwin himself well understood the functional advan-
tages of increased size and complexity. Indeed, the early twentieth
century biologists J.B.S. Haldane and Julian Huxley, in their
pioneering textbook Animal Biology (Haldane and Huxley, 1927),
viewed an increase in size and complexity over time as the very
essence of what they called “biological progress” (a characteriza-
tion that is, of course, widely rejected today) and pointed out,
among other things, the importance of modular organization and a
“division of labour” (pp. 234–235)8. Also noteworthy was the early
work on self-organization and the evolution of complexity by
Hutchinson (1965) and especially John Tyler Bonner. In his 1988
book, The Evolution of Complexity by Means of Natural Selection
(Bonner, 1988), Bonner explored at length the thesis that increased
size and complexity were interrelated, and that these were
functionally advantageous developments that had been favored
over time by natural selection (see also Bonner, 2003).
In the latter part of the twentieth century, the role of coopera-
tion in “symbiogenesis” – a term coined by the Russian theorist,
Mereschkovsky (1909) – was championed by Margulis (1970, 1993),
also Margulis and Fester (1991), especially in relation to the origin
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7 How can it be that natural selection was not involved in what Reid concedes
was an important trial-and-error dynamic—an “experiment”? Indeed, he tells us
that: “Given a choice among similar individuals, those whose wholes are slightly
greater than the sum of their parts will out-compete those whose wholes are
slightly less” (2007, p. 197). In other words, natural selection was involved, but Reid
restricts its role by assuming that basic homeostasis and organismal integrity
created an internal autonomy – a protected experimental laboratory – and by re-
defining natural selection so that it refers only to external ecological competition
and predation. Natural selection really was a key player after all, but Reid hides its
vital role in emergent evolution with a deeply flawed premise and a
semantic segue.
8 In Haldane and Huxley’s words: “Thus we cannot say that evolution consists
simply in the development of higher from lower forms of life; it consists of raising
the upper level of organization reached by living matter, while still permitting the
lower types of organization to survive. This general direction to be found in
evolution, this gradual rise in the upper level of control and independence to be
observed in living things over the passage of time, may be called evolutionary or
biological progress. It is obviously of great importance, and can be seen, on
reflection, to be another necessary consequence of the struggle for existence. This
improvement has been brought about in two main ways, which we may call
aggregation and individuation. Individuation is the improvement of the separate
unit, as seen, for example, in the series Hydra–Earthworm–Frog–Man. Aggregation
is the joining together of a number of separate units to form a super-unit, as when
coral polyps unite to form a colony. This is often followed by division of labour
among the various units, which of course is the beginning of individuation for the
super-unit, the turning of a mere aggregation into an individual.” (1927, pp. 234–5)
We thank Egbert Leigh for providing us with this quote.
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of eukaryotes but also more broadly (Margulis, 1998; Margulis and
Sagan, 2002). Margulis saw symbiogenesis as a major pathway to
increased complexity. Also important was Leigh (1977, 1991, 2010a,
2010b)’s work on “the common good” and on the factors allowing
group selection to override within-group selection (see also Leigh,
1983). Finally, the extensive work on the role of development, and
especially modularity, has further illuminated the evolution of
biological complexity. (See especially Gould, 1977; Jablonka and
Lamb, 1995; Raff, 1996; West-Eberhard, 2003; Kirschner and
Gerhart (2006); and Wagner, 2014.) Complexity has now become
a major theme in evolutionary biology (see below).
3.1. What is natural selection?
Here we will offer what is, in essence, an economic theory of
complexity called the “synergism hypothesis” (Corning, 1983, 2003,
2005, 2007a, 2013), a theory that is compatible with various
selection paradigms, including especially multi-level selection the-
ory. But before we unpack this theory, it is important first to clarify
the concept of natural selection, for it is often seriously misunder-
stood. The term is actually a metaphor for an important aspect, or
property of the ongoing evolutionary process. (Darwin’s inspiration
for his metaphor was the “artificial selection” practiced by animal
breeders.) Natural selection is really an umbrella concept that refers
to whatever functionally-significant factors (as opposed to historical
contingencies, fortuitous effects or physical laws and forces) are
responsible in a given context for causing differential survival and
reproduction. Properly conceptualized, these causal factors are
always relational; they are defined both by organism(s) and their
environment(s), and by the interactions between them.
Hence, we believe one cannot (technically) speak of a “mechan-
ism” or fix on a particular “selection pressure” in explaining the
workings of natural selection; these are only shorthand expressions.
Clearly, natural selection can produce adaptations that are mechan-
isms (the cell cycle, the bacterial flagellum, the ribosome, etc.), but
the “mechanism” of natural selection has a different meaning. One
must instead focus on the relationships and interactions that occur
within an organism, and between the organism and its environment
(s), inclusive of other organisms. Natural selection does not “do”
anything. As a causal agency, it refers to the functional consequences
for differential survival and reproduction of adaptively significant
changes in a given organism-environment relationship. In other
words, it is a way of characterizing the bioeconomic consequences
of any functional change. The “proximate” locus of causation is the
developing organism and the fully-developed phenotype in a given
environment—as many theorists have pointed out (e.g., Lande and
Arnold, 1983; Grafen, 1984; Brandon, 1996; Hammerstein, 1996;
Lewontin, 2000; Gould, 2002; West-Eberhard, 2003)9. We find useful
philosopher Dennett (1995) characterization of evolution as an
algorithmic process—a self-contained, step-by-step problem-solving
process, albeit one that also includes a degree of randomness (see
also Bäck, 1996; Maynard Smith, 1998).
Many things, at many different levels, may be responsible for
bringing about changes in an organism-environment relationship
and differential survival. It could be a functionally-significant
mutation, a chromosomal transposition, a change in the physical
environment that affects development (ontogeny), a change in one
species that affects another species, or (often enough) it could be a
change at the behavioral level that results in a new organism-
environment relationship. (For an in-depth discussion of the role
of behavior as a shaping influence in the evolutionary process, see
Corning, 2014; also Bateson, 1988, 2004; Weber and Depew, 2003;
Jablonka and Lamb, 2006a. See also the important work on “niche
construction theory” and “ecosystem engineering” in Odling-Smee
et al., 1996, 2003, 2013; Laland et al., 1999, inter alia.)
In fact, a whole sequence of changes may ripple through a
pattern of relationships. For instance, a climate change might alter
the local ecology, which might prompt a behavioral shift to a new
habitat or niche, which might encourage an alteration in nutri-
tional habits, which might precipitate changes in the interactions
among different species, resulting ultimately in the differential
survival and reproduction of alternative morphological characters
and the DNA coding sequences that support them. The long-
running research program among “Darwin’s finches” in the
Galápagos Islands, led by Peter Grant and his wife, Rosemary,
provides an in vivo illustration of this causal dynamic (Grant, 1986;
Grant and Grant, 2014; also Lack, 1961/1947; Weiner, 1994).
4. The synergism hypothesis
The synergism hypothesis represents an extension of this line of
reasoning. The focus is on the selection of functional “wholes” of diffe-
rent kinds, and the combinations of genes that produce those wholes.
Simply stated, cooperative interactions of various kinds, however they
may occur, can produce novel combined effects – synergies – that in
turn become causes of differential selection. In effect, the parts (and
their genes) that are responsible for producing the synergies may
become interdependent “units” of evolutionary change.
Thus, it is the “payoffs” associated with various synergistic effects
in a given context that constitute the underlying cause of cooperative
relationships – and complex organization – in nature. The synergy
produced by the “whole” provides the proximate functional benefits
that may differentially favor the survival and reproduction of the
“parts”. Although it may seem like backwards logic, the thesis is that
functional synergy is the underlying cause of cooperation, and
complexity, in living systems, not the other way around; proximate
causes and ultimate causes are closely intertwined. So it is really, at
heart, an economic theory of emergent complexity, and it applies
both to biological and socio-economic evolution, most notably in
humankind. (For more on this theory, see Corning, 2003, 2005.)
4.1. Synergy and the major transitions in evolution
John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry, in their two books on
The Major Transitions in Evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry,
1995) and The Origins of Life (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1999),
came to the same conclusion independently. As they put it in their
later book: “Cooperation will not evolve unless it pays. Two cooperat-
ing individuals must do better than they would if each acted on its
own…Behavioural examples are easy to think of, but the principle is
relevant at all levels” (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry,1999 pp. 23–24).
Indeed, the primary focus of their two books is the major turning
points in evolution that resulted in new levels of complexity. In every
case, these transitions involved important new forms of synergistic
cooperation, along with novel ways of storing, transmitting and using
information. The transitions they identified included the following:
The emergence of the first replicating molecules in segregated,
protective “enclosures”;
The origin of chromosomes, which linked various replicating
molecules together in cooperative relationships;
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9 To use Mayr’s (1961) well-known distinction, it is the “proximate” functional
effects arising from any change in the organism-environment relationship that are
the causes of the “ultimate” (transgenerational) changes in the genomes of a given
breeding population or species. It should also be noted that Laland et al. (2011)
concur. In a reconsideration of Mayr’s classic paper, they conclude that Mayr’s
proximate/ultimate distinction is deficient in that “it ignores the fact that
proximate mechanisms contribute to the dynamics of selection.” They argue that
the concepts of reciprocal causation and recursion might be more useful. See also
the cautionary analysis in Schulz (2014) regarding the imperfect relationship
between economic “utility” and biological “fitness”.
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The origin of the genetic code for protein synthesis that linked
RNA-based autocatalysis to that involving DNA and proteins;
The origin of eukaryotes from independent, free-living prokaryotes;
The rise of sexual reproduction;
The emergence of multi-cellular organisms and, over time, the
development of an increasingly elaborate division of labor (or,
more accurately, a “combination of labor”);
The origin of social groups culminating in complex, highly
integrated, communications-dependent species with a social
division/combination of labor, like honeybees and humans.
As Queller (1997, 2000) has pointed out, these transitions involved
two distinct pathways, which he characterized as “fraternal” and
“egalitarian”. In the former case, all of the participants were closely
related, and this greatly facilitated the emergence of a reproductive
division of labor (separation of the germ line), as well as the appearance
of functionally differentiated tissues. A striking example is the rise of
multi-cellular organisms. In the egalitarian case, the pathway was more
“democratic” in the sense that each of the participants was genetically
unrelated and retained the freedom to reproduce independently, while
providing complementary functions for a new partnership. An obvious
example here is the symbiotic mitochondria in eukaryotic cells (see also
Queller, 2004)10 .Q4 Accordingly, the two terms “division of labor” and
“combination of functions” as used by Queller (1997) refer to the origin
of specialized actors in the fraternal and egalitarian scenarios, respec-
tively. Our term “combination of labor” is functionally-oriented and
includes both forms of cooperation.
As Maynard Smith and Szathmáry anticipated, other theorists
have subsequently augmented their list of transitions, or have
modified it in various ways. For instance, Jablonka and Lamb
(2006b) consider the evolution of the nervous system, and the many
changes that have resulted in the way information is stored and
transmitted within living organisms, as another major breakthrough.
There have also been various criticisms of the major transitions
paradigm over the years (e.g., Calcott and Sterelny, 2011). In
particular, there is a continuing debate about how to define biological
complexity and exactly what a major transition in evolution means
(see Szathmáry, 2015 for a thorough update of the field).
4.2. Measuring complexity
Our view is that there is no one correct way to measure
complexity, or the major trends and transitions in evolution; they
can be defined in different ways for different purposes. As a way of
characterizing the broad evolutionary trend culminating (tempo-
rally at least) in humankind, we suggest two alternative meth-
odologies (at least in theory). One is structural: A synthetic
complexity scale compounded from the number of levels of
organization (inclusive of social organization), the number of
distinct “parts”, the number of different kinds of parts, and the
number of interconnections among the parts.
The other method is functional: A complexity scale derived
from the number of functionally discrete “tasks” in the division/
combination of labor at all levels, coupled with the quantity of
“control information” that is generated and utilized by the system.
(Control information is defined as the capacity to control the
“capacity to do work” in a cybernetic process; it is equivalent to
the amount of thermodynamic work that a system can perform.
See Corning and Kline, 1998; Corning, 2005, 2007b.)
4.3. Defining synergy
A word is in order here about how to define synergy. As used
here, the term refers to the combined, cooperative effects that
arise from the relationships and interactions among various forces,
particles, elements, genes, genomes, parts, individuals, or groups
in a given context—effects that are not otherwise attainable. The
term is derived from the Greek word synergos, meaning “working
together” or, literally, “co-operating.” Synergy is often associated
with the cliché “The whole is greater than the sum of its parts,”
which dates back to Aristotle (as quoted above), but sometimes
wholes are not greater than the sum of their parts, just different. A
classic, much cited example is water, a versatile liquid com-
pounded from the two elemental gases hydrogen and oxygen.
So defined, synergy is strictly a functional term, and the
benefits and/or costs for the various “parts” must be separately
determined. Although the term is sometimes treated as a synonym
for cooperation, in fact it refers to the functional effects that are
produced by cooperation. It highlights a class of causal influences
with distinct functional properties (they are inherently relational
and interdependent)—properties which, in the natural world, are
always subject to the ultimate “verdict” of natural selection.
Some theorists may object to using such a broad definition of
synergy, but it would be arbitrary to limit it only to a subset of
cooperative effects and, more serious, would be unjustified if it
excludes categories that are theoretically relevant. Another frequent
objection is that the term should exclude additive forms of coopera-
tion and include only those that involve “non-additive” phenomena.
However, there are many forms of synergy that cannot be reduced to
quantitative terms; they involve “qualitative novelties,” as the
emergence theorists have insisted. The criterion should be whether
or not there are combined effects that are interdependent and cannot
be achieved by the “parts” acting alone. Szathmáry (2002) cites the
interactions between organelles in a eukaryotic cell as an example
and illustrates with a steeply rising, non-linear “fitness curve.”
In a similar fashion, if two hyenas can achieve success by
coordinating their hunting activities but would not be successful
if each one hunted independently, their combined efforts are
synergistic; the two hyenas “added together” produce an interde-
pendent, qualitatively different functional result. By the same token,
if a specialization and division of labor (what we prefer to call a
“combination of labor”) can achieve significant economies/efficien-
cies with respect some overarching task or goal, this too is
synergistic. In economics, the archetypical example is the descrip-
tion of an eighteenth century pin factory in Smith (1964/1776).
Smith observed that the ten workers together were able to produce
“upwards” of 48,000 pins per day, whereas, Smith opined, they
probably could not independently have produced even 20 pins per
man11. In biology, the archetypical example is, perhaps, the eukar-
yotic cell, and it is insufficient merely to say that the interactions
among various organelles in a eukaryote are non-additive.
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10 Since the actors that come together are functionally different to begin with,
their separate functions can be combined, which provides the major advantage in
egalitarian transitions. However, in the classical division/combination of labor
scenario, labor is, of course, “divided” among the collaborators and then combined
in a synergistic manner. It is also important to note that egalitarian transitions
invariably involve a non-linear element at the outset. If the partners have
complementary roles, one of them alone can do very little or nothing in the
particular context. In the case of the fraternal transitions functional complementary
is secondary, but does not necessarily require a long time to evolve. Cells when
staying together to form primitive multicellular bodies (Schlichting, 2003) and
individual insects when forming a colony (Robinson, 1992) may readily divide
labor, as a result of the original individual adaptations and different thresholds for
behavioral responses in different individuals. Apart from this, the initial advantage
of staying together can be non-linear (hence synergistic) even among individuals of
the same species. Such economies of scale may have been associated with the
origin of many fraternal transitions (Queller, 1997). We will return to this
issue below.
11 See also 〈http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/adam-smith/wealth-nations.
pdf〉 (accessed November 30, 2014), p. 11.
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It is also important to note that there are many different forms
of selectively-relevant synergy in the natural world, including
synergies of scale (when larger numbers, or a larger size, provide
an otherwise unattainable collective survival advantage), thresh-
old effects, functional complementarities, augmentation or facil-
itation (as in catalysis), joint environmental conditioning, risk- and
cost-sharing, information-sharing, collective intelligence, animal-
tool “symbiosis” and, of course, the many examples of a division
(combination) of labor at every level in living systems (see
Corning, 1983, 2003, 2005; Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995,
1999). Indeed, the major role of a division/combination of labor in
the evolution of complexity has been highlighted by a number of
theorists in recent years (e.g., Bonner, 2003; Kirk, 2005; Ratcliff
et al., 2012; Simpson, 2012; Wilson, 2013)12.
5. Facilitators and constraints
To be sure, many factors can influence the likelihood of
cooperation—the ecological context, specific opportunities, com-
petitive pressures, the risks (and costs) of cheating/parasitism,
effective deterrents to “defection”, genetic relatedness, genetic
“preadaptations”, and especially the distribution of costs and
benefits. However, an essential requisite for sustainable coopera-
tion is functional synergy. Just as natural selection is agnostic
about the sources of the “variations” that can influence differential
survival and reproduction, the synergism hypothesis is agnostic
about how synergistic effects may arise in nature. They could be
self-organized; they could be a product of some chance variation;
they could arise from a happenstance symbiotic relationship; or
they could be the result of a purpose-driven behavioral innovation
by some living organism (see Corning, 2014).
It is also important to note that there are a great many different
kinds of negative synergy (or “dysergy”) in the natural world—
cooperative effects that are deleterious to one or more partici-
pants, or to various “bystanders”. For instance, cooperative hunt-
ing might be very beneficial for a group of predators, but the
outcome would amount to negative synergy for their prey. Para-
sitism also provides innumerable examples. (More on negative
synergy can be found in Corning, 2003.)
It should also be stressed that the synergies produced by
cooperation can almost always be measured and quantified in
various ways. Most often in the natural world they are related
directly to survival and reproduction. Thus, hunting or foraging
collaboratively – a behavior found in many bacteria, insects, birds,
fish and mammals – may increase the size of the prey that can be
pursued, the likelihood of success in capturing prey or the
collective probability of finding a food “patch”. Joint defensive
action against potential predators – alarm calling, herding, com-
munal nesting, synchronized reproduction, coordinated defensive
measures, and more – may greatly reduce the individual’s risk of
becoming a meal for some other creature.
Likewise, shared defense of food resources – a practice com-
mon to social insects, birds and social carnivores alike – may
provide greater food security for all. Cooperation in nest-building,
and in the nurturing and protection of the young, may significantly
improve the collective odds of reproductive success. Coordinated
movement and migration, including the use of formations to inc-
rease aerodynamic or hydrodynamic efficiency, may reduce indi-
vidual energy expenditures and/or facilitate navigation. Forming a
coalition against competitors may improve the chances of acquir-
ing a mate, or a nest-site, or access to needed resources (such as a
water–hole, a food patch, or potential prey).
However, the costs and benefits of any synergistic effect are
always contingent and context specific and must, on balance,
provide a “profit” in terms of the impact on survival and reproduc-
tion. Thus, it may not make sense to form a herd, or a shoal, or a
communal nest if there are no threatening predators about,
especially if proximity encourages the spread of parasites or
concentrates the competition for locally scarce resources. Nor
does it make sense for emperor penguins in the Antarctic to
huddle together to share heat (as they do in winter) during the
warm summer months, or for Mexican desert spiders to huddle
against the threat of dehydration during the rainy season. And
hunting as a group is not advantageous if the prey are small and
easily caught by an individual hunter without assistance.
Richard Michod, in his book Darwinian Dynamics (Michod, 1999),
observes that “cooperation is now seen as the primary creative force
behind ever greater levels of complexity and organization in all of
biology” (p. xi). However, it is not cooperation per se that is the
“creative force.” Rather, it is the functional consequences or effects
produced by cooperation that are the key. And these in turn are
shaped by various kinds of functional synergy. In other words, it is
synergies of different kinds that have been the drivers for the
evolution of cooperation and multi-level complex systems over time;
the synergism hypothesis draws our attention to a broad class of
causal influences that are found at all levels of organization through-
out the living world, from genomes to empires. In a review of the
current theoretical debate among proponents of inclusive fitness
theory and its various opponents, Gadagkar (2010) points out that
“the problem with most empirical studies inspired by [inclusive
fitness theory] is that they have neglected the benefit and cost terms
and focused almost exclusively on relatedness.” (See also Fletcher
et al., 2006; Michod and Herron, 2006; West et al., 2007a; Brown and
Vincent, 2008.) The synergism hypothesis speaks to this concern.
6. Synergistic selection
One way of framing this economically-oriented causal dynamic
is with the term coined by Maynard Smith (1982) paper on “The
Evolution of Social Behaviour,” where he identified synergistic
selection as one of six different kinds of selection processes, along
with individual selection, interdemic selection, kin selection, group
selection, and reciprocal altruism. In his original formulation,
Maynard Smith assumed that social cooperation necessarily invo-
lves altruism (as did most theorists of that era), and he defined
synergistic selection as a process which involves non-relatives that
interact as individuals. He compared it to Wilson’s (1975) concept of
“trait group selection,” which also assumed an altruistic trait. (See
also Leigh, 1997, 1991, 2010b’s, work on the “common good.”)
However, in Maynard Smith’s analysis, the focus was not on the
structure and composition of a “group” but rather on the functional/
economic advantages (the synergies) that a group might possess as a
result of their interactions. (Maynard Smith’s analysis is summarized
in Box 1.) In a subsequent paper, Maynard Smith (1983) also drew on
Wilson’s trait group selection model to illustrate how synergistic
interactions might be selectively advantageous (although he viewed
Wilson’s term as inadequate). As Maynard Smith noted, it is the size
of the “interaction term” in a synergistic selection model that is the
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12 Bonner (2003) proposed that an increase in size has been a “prime mover” in
the evolution of biological “differentiation.” Kirk (2005), a student of volvocine
green algae, identified what he called a “twelve-step program” leading from
ancestral Chlamydomonas to Volvox (notable for its division/combination of labor)
and found that it did not require a large number of genetic changes. Ratcliff et al.,
(2012), in a series of experiments in unicellular yeast (Saccharomyces cerevisiae),
concluded that the benefits associated with a division/combination of labor played
a key role in the emergence of multi-cellular “clusters”. Finally, Simpson (2012)
hypothesized that a reproductive division/combination of labor has led the way in
“the majority of cases” where multi-cellularity has evolved. All of these theorists
recognized the importance of a division/combination of labor but did not stress the
independent causal role of the functional benefits—the synergies.
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key factor. He likened synergistic selection to selection for “mutual-
ism” in symbiotic relationships. Thus, Maynard Smith was shifting
the theoretical focus to the functional dynamics of the phenotypes—
the “vehicles” rather than the “replicators”, in Dawkins’ (1989/1976)
terminology.
Needless to say, Maynard Smith’s views about the nature of
cooperation and the role of synergy evolved and expanded over time
as he (and others, including Wilson) came to recognize that the term
“cooperation” can refer simply to functional relationships and inter-
actions of all kinds. In this formulation, cooperation may or may not
also be considered “altruistic” or selfish, mutualistic or parasitic,
positive or negative. Such attributes involve additional, post-hoc
judgments about the consequences of a cooperative relationship
with respect to some separately specified goals or values for the
various participants. Indeed, there can even be coerced cooperation,
where punishments are used as enforcers in a deeply asymmetrical
relationship. An extreme example is a slave system13 .Q5
Accordingly, we believe that the concept of synergistic selection
can legitimately be expanded to include all the circumstances, at all
levels of biological organization, in which synergistic effects exert a
significant causal influence in evolutionary continuity and change.
(We should note that the role of synergistic selectionwas also stressed
by Maynard Smith in his 1998 textbook and, of course, in The Major
Transitions.) As Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995) observed in The
Major Transitions (p. 261), “if an individual can produce two offspring
on its own but by cooperating in a group consisting of ‘n’ individuals
can produce ‘3n’ offspring, it pays to cooperate.”
(It should be pointed out that this approach also has the effect of
shifting the focus from “synchronic” treatments of group selection to a
“diachronic” approach. Thus, what could be called multilevel selection
type 1, where groups do not reproduce and group fitness is the
average fitness of individuals in that group, can give rise through
evolution to multilevel selection type 2, where groups reproduce as
units and group fitness is neither defined in terms of, nor proportional
to, average individual fitness, as Okasha, 2005, has noted.)
Thus, synergistic selection can be observed in processes as
diverse as symbiosis, social selection, kin selection, group selection,
altruism, mutualism, and, arguably, even in some cases character-
ized as manipulation or parasitism. Whenever synergies are in fact
the functional drivers in any of these well-known theoretical
categories, they also provide examples of synergistic selection. In
other words, synergistic selection highlights a major functional/
causal influence in selectively relevant biological processes when
two or more genes, genomes, parts, individuals, groups, or even
species are involved. (One route for achieving a favorable synergistic
selection regime is represented in the theoretical work on so-called
n-person public goods games with non-linear synergistic benefits.
See Archetti and Scheuring, 2012. A different model, involving what
we refer to as “corporate goods,” can be found in Box 2. See also
Frank, 1995 on the role of synergy in symbiosis.)
7. The problem of “control”
Synergy may be necessary for cooperation and complex organi-
zation, but it is obviously not sufficient. There are many challenges
and obstacles associated with achieving and sustaining cooperative
relationships, and these can be viewed as different aspects of the
broad, many-faceted problem of control.
Perhaps most important is the problem of establishing and coordinat-
ing the relationships among the “parts”—that is, the cybernetic problem of
communications and control in any teleonomic (“purposeful”) dynamic
system. The evolution of informational processes is addressed in some
detail in TheMajor Transitions and The Origins if Life, where it is shown that
new forms of information have played a key role in the emergence of
complexity at every level, from DNA coding sequences in the genome to
pheromone “signals” in social insects, the evolution of language in
humankind, and (now) the binary/digital code of the internet age.
(For a critique of traditional information theory and a functional alter-
native, see Corning and Kline,1998; also Corning, 2007b. For a perspective
on the synergistic nature of human language and its integration with
other cognitive abilities, see Szathmáry and Számadó, 2008.)
Another critical set of challenges to achieving and sustaining
synergistic cooperation are the many different problems related to
the integrity and stability of various physical, biological and chemical
processes, especially the potential for errors or mistakes, wear and
tear, and environmental threats and depredations of varying kinds.
Over time, living systems have evolved a great many mechanisms for
dealing with these problems, from regulatory and repair capabilities at
the molecular level to morphological redundancies, sensory/feedback
capacities, developmental flexibilities, and, indeed, the opportunities
for renewal and change associated with reproduction itself. Innumer-
able examples can be found in any introductory biology textbook.
There is also a major class of control issues related to the ever-
present problems of reproductive competition, “cheating,” and
free-riding in the natural world, as evolutionary theorists ever
since Darwin have stressed, and there is a vast and ever-increasing
body of theory and research on various aspects of this challenge, with
hundreds of analytical models. These constraints and facilitators are
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
Box 1–Maynard Smith’s “synergistic selection” model.
Synergistic selection is best illustrated by the simple
textbook case in Maynard Smith (1998). Let W0 be the
fitness in the absence of interaction, c is the cost of help, b is
the benefit that one cooperator C can provide and s is a non-
additive bonus when two cooperators meet. In standard
game theoretical format:
D C
D W0 W0þb
C W0"c W0þb–c"s
Let us consider the two cases: an additive one (left) and
synergistic one:
W0¼2, b¼2, c¼1, s¼0 W0¼2, b¼2, c¼1, s¼2
D C D C
D 2 4 D 2 4
C 1 3 C 1 5
It is apparent that for the additive case D is always the
ESS, whereas for the synergistic case it pays to play D when
meeting D, but it is better to play C when meeting C (s4c).
The additive case corresponds to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
When C gets somehow established (e.g., through kinship), it
remains stable without punishment, or kin selection, or
the like.
13 It should be noted that some theorists continue to define cooperation in such a
way that it is theoretically problematical: altruism is treated as the default state.
Thus, Sachs et al. (2004), claim that “Cooperation by definition involves an
interaction between individuals that benefits the recipient but not necessarily
the donor.” See also Lehmann and Keller (2006), West et al. (2007a, 2007b, 2011).
We disagree with this definition. One problem is that it conflates the functional
properties of cooperation with the costs and benefits for the participants, and even
perhaps with their psychological motivations. It also blurs the still-relevant
distinction between proximate and ultimate explanations. These should be kept
distinct from one another. The framework proposed by Sachs and his colleagues
also obscures the phenomenon of “teamwork,” joint efforts toward a common goal
where there are no “donors” and “recipients”.
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addressed in such familiar structural categories as kin selection,
group selection, indirect reciprocity, the extensive work on the role of
“policing” and “sanctions” in cooperative relationships, and much
more. (For an up-to-date overview, see the fiftieth anniversary issue
of the Journal of Theoretical Biology in 2012 with some 20 articles
devoted to various aspects of cooperation. For a critical review of the
work on sanctions, see Frederickson, 2013.)
7.1. Rowing versus “sculling”
It should also be noted that there is another “structural” category of
cooperative relationships that is often underrated or even overlooked,
namely the many contexts in which there is a functional interdepen-
dence, and when the participants are dependent upon the benefits
(the synergies) in such a way that cheating or free-riding would
undermine those benefits and become self-defeating. Whenever such
interdependencies exist, and they are more common than is often
appreciated, a cooperative relationship is, in effect, self-enforcing.
(Many mutualisms fit this model, as Leigh, 2010a has pointed out.)
Or, alternatively, it may involve a situation where any “policing” costs
are offset by enhanced benefits. These are examples of what Maynard
Smith termed an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).
A hypothetical example is provided in The Major Transitions. It
involves a game theory model in which two oarsmen in a rowboat are
seeking a common objective, like crossing a river. If the two oarsmen
utilize a “sculling” arrangement, each one would have a pair of oars
and they would row in tandem. In this situation, it is easy (in theory at
least) for one oarsman to slack off and let the other one do the heavy
work. This corresponds to the classical two-person game. However, in
a two-person “rowing” model, each oarsman has only one opposing
oar. Now their relationship to the performance of the boat is
interdependent. If one oarsman slacks off, the boat will go in circles.
An obvious biological example can be found in chromosomes. If a
“selfish gene,” in Dawkins’ (1989/1976) metaphor, “defects” (and
there are numerous well-known examples—see Crow, 1979), it
undermines the ability of the genome to reproduce the organism
successfully. Indeed, thanks to the human genome sequencing
project, we now know that reproduction requires close collaboration
(and synergy) among our 20,000 plus genes. One well-documented
example is the homeobox (or Hox) cluster, a remarkably conserved
gene set (with variations in number, from 8 to more than 40) that
collectively determines the basic body plans of Drosophila flies,
human embryos, and everything in between (Hunt, 1998). It is also
relevant to mention the “parliament of genes” metaphor in this
context, introduced by Leigh (1971). An individual selfish gene may
be suppressed by an appropriate mutant of any other gene if all other
genes are behaving in an orderly Mendelian manner: the latter
in effect “vote the selfish member down.” It is an objective of major
transitions research to explain how “institutions” suppressing within-
unit competition/conflict may have originated at various levels of
organization in the first place.
The interdependent “rowing” scenario is especially relevant when-
ever a cooperative relationship involves a division (combination) of
labor or a functional complementarity. In such cases, a defection or
default could be fatal to a synergistic relationship. Imagine, as a
thought experiment, a hemoglobin molecule without its heme group,
or a eukaryotic cell without its mitochondria, or, for that matter, an
automobile without a wheel. The synergies would vanish.
It is also important to emphasize that, in theory, the synergies in
any given situation may be independent of how the costs and
benefits are distributed among the participants (see Box 2). However,
the distribution of costs and benefits matters greatly. Indeed, it is
central to the distinctions theorists make between positive symbiosis
and parasitism, mutualism and altruistic “sacrifices”, reciprocity and
free-riding, etc. This is the reason why the outcome in any game
theory model is always dependent upon how the “payoff matrix” is
constructed. And this is also why the ideal distribution of costs and
benefits in any voluntaristic relationship is represented by a “Nash
equilibrium” in which none of the participants can improve on their
lot by defecting. (For more extensive discussion of this issue see
especially Steven Frank’s “The Origin of Synergistic Symbiosis,” 1995,
and Binmore, 2005) Of course, measuring the benefits and costs in
any real world situation is often a challenge.
8. A technical note on the levels of selection debate
Finally, we wish to emphasize that the causal dynamics under-
lying the concept of synergistic selection are fully compatible with
both kin selection theory and multi-level, or group selection
theory. Here is our view of the matter.
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Box 2–The “corporate goods” model of cooperation and synergy.
Corporate goods are benefits that are jointly produced by two
or more participants but, unlike public goods, can be divided
up in different ways among the actors—for example, the
distribution of meat from a large game animal procured by a
group of hunters, or the sales receipts for the pins produced in
Adam Smith’s pin factory. (We note that the term “public
goods” is often misused in the evolutionary literature,
because one of the defining features of public goods is that
they are non-rivalrous. This is not true for corporate goods.)
In order for a corporate goods relationship to be favorably
selected (synergistic selection) and be “sustainable” (or
evolutionarily stable), the following conditions apply:
i. There must be an overall “profit” (the benefits must
outweigh the costs).
ii. The benefits to each participant (direct, indirect, or both)
net of the costs must be positive.
iii. The relationship is supported/sustained by one or more of
the following:
a. There is a functional interdependence, such that the
relationship is self-enforcing (as in the “rowing mod-
el”);
b. There is no better alternative (i.e., a more favorable
benefit-cost ratio) available to any participant by
“defecting” to some other relationship (a Nash equili-
brium);
c. The benefits may be reduced or denied to any defector;
d. There is some other punishment/sanction for defecting
(e.g., ostracism, denial of other benefits in a multi-
faceted cooperative relationship, etc.).
Several models in the evolutionary literature utilize a
corporate goods paradigm. One example is the stochastic
corrector model (Szathmáry and Demeter, 1987; Grey et al.,
1995; Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995). In this model,
different replicating genes (assumed to be ribozymes) co-
operate in order to drive the metabolism of a protocell.
Replication rates of the genes differ, so there is within-
compartment competition (an early form of intra-genomic
conflict), which translates to differential sharing of the
corporate good (the raw materials for reproduction). Fast-
replicating genes have a within-compartment advantage. It
can be shown that, without a “corrective” population
structure, such a model is unstable, despite the tight
functional coupling among the genes for metabolism. It is
important to add that, since here protocells are also units of
evolution, variation among them, generated by stochasticity
in growth and assortment, is a “target” on which natural
selection “acts” among the protocells. (The stochastic correc-
tor is also one of the earliest models of multi-level selection.)
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In order to appreciate the relevant subtleties of a sometimes arcane
debate, we will use the example of primordial evolution, since the
issues relating to the first major transitions, involving molecules and
protocells, are behaviorally simpler than in more complex organisms.
As Eigen (1971) recognized, inaccurate replicators must somehow
combine to form a genome. But there is a problem. If chromosomes
are too long to be maintained by selection, the genome must consist of
unlinked genes, which in turn gives rise to an early version of
“intragenomic conflict” in that the genes can compete with each other.
This conflict must somehow be mediated. Eigen (1971) proposed the
hypercycle as a solution inwhich (in its two-member form) molecule A
catalyses the replication of molecule B, and vice versa. There is synergy,
because there can be no coherent growth of the whole system unless
both partners are present; the effect is non-additive and synergistic.
When both molecules are present, the system is ecologically stable.
But there is also a problem, as Maynard Smith (1979) observed.
Imagine a parasite A’ that replicates faster than A by accepting the
help given by B but in return gives back little or nothing. Accord-
ingly, without some population structure the systemwill go extinct.
This teaches us that synergy provides great opportunities, but its
origin and maintenance may require some form of multilevel
selection. A simple way of taming the parasites is to put the
hypercycles into compartments, in which case protocells with fewer
parasites enjoy a reproductive advantage at the protocell level.
Now consider this case in light of the sculling game. The
hypercycle resembles this model, and a parasite in the hypercycle
is comparable to the oarsman who is not pulling on his (or her) oar.
The boat corresponds to biological compartmentalization: literally,
if the cooperators are in the same boat, it does not pay to rock it. In
the sculling game there are two evolutionarily stable strategies
(ESSs) and the spread of a cooperative equilibrium requires some
grouping and selection at that level. The question is what might be
the nature of this grouping, in addition to (and temporally before)
reproductive compartmentalization? Here we must address some
general questions relating to altruism, kin, and group selection.
Let us assume, as in the network of the stochastic corrector model,
that two replicators A and B both contribute to a common metabo-
lism M, which is a “corporate good” (Box 2). Assume M cannot work
unless both genes are present. In other words, there is a clear synergy
between A and B through complementary functions. Despite this
synergy, however, the system is ecologically unstable even in the
absence of parasites, provided A or B can drain metabolites (the
corporate good) differentially for their own replication. The stochastic
corrector model shows that reproductive compartments also save this
system. Is it possible to have a simpler, but still effective, population
structure ensuring cooperative coexistence? The answer is yes. It can
be achieved in the surface-bound metabolic replicator model (Czárán
and Szathmáry, 2000). Here a purely random formation of local
groups is sufficient to maintain the coexistence of the cooperators in a
basically D.S. Wilson-type (Wilson, 1975) MLS1 model. This is so
because A relative to a faster replicating parasitic mutant A’ is a weak
altruist (Wilson, 1990) that pays only a relative cost; it helps itself as
well, but it helps others even more.
Imagine, in contrast, a “one-member” hypercycle, i.e., a repli-
case enzyme R that is helping the replication of other copies of
itself. R0 is a parasite that is enzymatically inefficient but replicates
when helped by R faster than R itself (Szabó et al., 2002). This
system cannot be saved from the spread of R0 by random grouping
because R pays an absolute cost. In other words, one copy of R
cannot help itself, because it needs another R acting as a template.
Limited dispersal, and consequent kin selection, is necessary for
survival. The same is true for hypercycles in general. Of course, the
previously mentioned reproductive compartmentalization in pro-
tocells can also solve the problem via group selection.
The moral is that, when fitness costs are absolute, kin or group
selection must operate. So we cannot escape considering the relation
between the two. Hamilton (1975) cast Wilson (1975)’s model into a
kin selection framework, showing that the Price formalism can
express group (multilevel) selection as well (see also Crow and
Aoki, 1982). Without going into the details here, there is a general
feeling that, after all, it is a matter of taste, a secondary criterion,
which type of modeling one can use. Others, however (e.g., Nowak,
E.O. Wilson), argue that inclusive fitness calculations can give wrong
answers. We call attention here to the important overview of Birch
and Okasha (2015), who analyzed the various claims about inclusive
fitness in detail. First, they point out that it pays to distinguish
between three different versions of Hamilton’s rule: (i) the general
rule based on the use of regression, (ii) the special case, where costs
and benefits are payoffs from an evolutionary model, and (iii) the
approximate case where costs and benefits are first-order, marginal
approximations of the regression coefficients. The conclusion is that
(i) is always true, has explanatory but no predictive power. Case (ii)
works well without synergy, but, when synergy is present, modifica-
tions of the original rule are needed on a case by case basis (van
Veelen, 2009). Case (iii) is by definition approximate14 .
It would seem, therefore, that inclusive fitness works generally, but
only in a loose sense, and in the various “stretched” situations it loses
elegance and power. In the general case (i), inclusive fitness depends
on the whole population state, and the assertion that the goal of an
evolutionary agent is to “maximize its inclusive fitness” is not very
helpful. Many actors in this debate nevertheless seem to believe that
in principle kin and group selection models can always be translated
into each other. This is not so. Especially in relation to the discussion
about the major transitions, consider again the stochastic corrector
model (Box 2). It is a continuous-time, fully dynamic model with
reproducing and dying-out groups. Szathmáry (2012) suspected that a
kin selection version of this model would be impossible, and Simon
(2014) has shown that this is indeed the case. Kin selection versions of
such group selection models are dynamically insufficient. Once you
solve the group selection model you can always post hoc make up one
using inclusive fitness, but this produces no additional information.
Note that the stochastic corrector model (Szathmáry and Demeter,
1987) was preceded by the application of the samemodel to the origin
of eukaryotic cells (Szathmáry, 1986), where protocells and cells
provide strict group selection conditions.
Where does this leave us in relation to synergy? Synergistic
interactions provide many opportunities for an increase in com-
plexity. If these interactions are cooperative in the evolutionary
sense, some appropriate selective influence is needed to stabilize
the interaction. Sometimes there is a synergy between a synergistic
interaction and selection. This happens in cases where the interac-
tion allows for a cooperative equilibrium—when cooperators have
an interdependent common interest (as in the rowing game). In
these cases, the “work” needed from multilevel/kin selection is
modest. When synergy does not lead to a stable synergistic equil-
ibrium, it is harder to stabilize. But in all cases the complex
interaction structure that gets selected is based on synergy among
the components, and these synergies translate into considerable
fitness advantages under the appropriate selection scenario.
9. Synergistic selection in recent publications
In recent years there has been a steadily increasing apprecia-
tion for the role of synergy in evolution. As West et al. (2008) point
out (paraphrasing a comment in Maynard Smith, 1983): “A greater
understanding in evolutionary biology is often obtained by looking
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14 As Leigh (personal communication) points out, the so-called “egalitarian
syndrome” in humankind (Boehm, 1997), including our monogamous propensities,
represent a clear cut example of social behaviors that have served to reduce within-
group reproductive variance.
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at the same problem in different ways.” Below is a brief survey of
the rapidly growing number of synergy-oriented publications.
Some early efforts to find a theoretical basis for non-kin coopera-
tion, though still constrained by the altruism assumption, included
papers by Matessi and Jayakar (1976), Cohen and Eshel (1976) and
Uyenoyama (1979), as well as the papers and a book byWilson (1975,
1977, 1978, 1980) regarding his trait group selection model. (An early
paper by Leigh, 1983, showed that within-group variance in repro-
ductive success must be far lower than between-group variance in
order for group selection to overcome strong within-group selection.)
Following the publication of Maynard Smith’s synergistic selection
paper, other theorists began to move toward a more explicitly
functional/synergism approach (often characterized as “non-additive”
effects), notably including Queller (1985), Nee (1989) and Mesterton-
Gibbons and Dugatkin (1992). Synergy was also invoked in the book-
length thesis by Buss (1987), mentioned earlier, about the evolution of
metazoans, and in a paper by Avilés (1999) that incorporated syn-
ergistic effects into a model of cooperative behaviors that utilized
non-linear dynamics (see also Avilés et al., 2002).
Also notable were the papers by Frank (1995, 1997, 2006) on the
role of synergy in the evolution of symbioses. Frank (1995) con-
cluded: “A dominant theme in the history of life has been the
evolutionary innovations of cooperative symbiosis.” Elsewhere, Frank
(2006) elaborated: “The first genomes near the origin of life probably
evolved by biochemical synergism between different replicating
molecules; eukaryotic cells arose by symbioses between different
species; and lichens, mycorrhizal-plant systems, and many other
symbioses have contributed greatly to the complexity of modern
life.” Indeed, there is a growing appreciation among biologists for the
fact that symbiotic relationships are ubiquitous in nature and provide
an important source of evolutionary innovations. (For more on
symbiogenesis, see Sapp, 2004, 2009; Gontier, 2007; Carrapiço,
2010; Leigh, 2010a, 2010b; Gilbert et al., 2012; Pereira et al., 2012.)
A growing number of theorists over time have also explicitly
adopted the term synergistic selection with regard to various
biological phenomena. For instance, Guilford and Cuthill (1991)
referred to it in their explanation for the evolution of warning
coloration in marine gastropods. Toumi and Augner (1993) used it
in relation to the evolution in plants of traits for unpalatability to
predators. And Leimar and Toumi (1998) extended their work on
the evolution of plant defenses to a consideration of how syner-
gistic selection might work with “graded traits”15.
It should be noted that David Sloan Wilson’s views on the
evolution of cooperation and complexity have also evolved over time.
He adopted amore functionally-focused approach to defining “groups”
in two papers with Elliott Sober (Wilson and Sober, 1989, 1994) and in
their co-authored book, Unto Others (Sober and Wilson, 1998), where
they provided numerous examples and case-studies of functional
(synergistic) group selection. They also promoted the idea that an
organized groupmay have properties that are analogous to those of an
individual organism—a “superorganism”. (A history and critical analy-
sis of this term can be found in Corning, 2005; see also Wilson, 2006;
Wilson and Sober, 1989; Hölldobler and Wilson, 2009)16.
Also notable is Richard Michod’s extensive work on the major
transitions in evolution and the challenge of attaining new levels of
“individuality” (functional interdependence) (Michod, 1999, 2005,
2007, 2011; see also Ghiselin, 1997). Michod’s particular focus is the
rise of multi-cellularity, as well as the origins of sexual reproduc-
tion, and he rightly emphasizes the cardinal importance of a
division/combination of labor. He uses as his models the diverse
colonies of volvocine green algae, which can range in size from a
handful of cells to several thousand specialized cells arrayed in a
large hollow sphere. As Bell (1985) first documented many years
ago, the much larger, more complex Volvox species enjoy significant
functional advantages over the smaller Gonium. Indeed, the rudi-
mentary division/combination of labor in Volvox colonies has long
been considered a “transitional” example pointing toward one of
the most distinctive characteristics of multi-cellular organisms17 .
Among the many more recent examples of synergy-oriented
publications, the theoretical paper by Nowak et al. (2010) on “The
Evolution of Eusociality” – which challenges kin selection theory –
is particularly relevant18. With regard to the emergence of eusocial
insects in particular, the major causal factors singled out by these
theorists were collaboration in building collectively defensible
nests and an internal division/combination of labor, both syner-
gistic behavioral processes. (But see also the sharp criticisms of
this paper in Abbot et al., 2011 et. seq., and the authors’ reply.)
Other recent theoretical support for the role of synergy includes a
paper by Nowak (2006), where he identifies five “rules” for coopera-
tion (kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network
reciprocity and group selection) and points out that each depends
upon the benefit-cost ratios—in other words, the synergies. (See also
Nowak, 2011, 2012.) Traulsen and Nowak (2006) also stress the role
of multilevel selection in the evolution of cooperation. Hauert et al.
(2006) examine the effect of discounting in synergistically enhanced
benefits based on the number of cooperators. Calcott (2008) invokes
synergies in relation to the all-important benefit side of the cost-
benefit calculus in cooperative behaviors, while Wilson and Wilson
(2008) highlight the synergistic potential of social information.
Referring to a phenomenon characterized as “the group mind,”
Wilson and Wilson observe that “the collective benefits of making
a wise decision can be great and the within group costs can be low.”
(See also Seeley, 1995 for an example in honeybees.)
van Veelen (2009) also argues that group selection models are
required where synergies are involved. Citing examples, he observes
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15 However, the term has not always been used correctly, in our view. Tim Caro,
in his book on Anti-predator Defenses in Birds and Mammals (2005) equates
Synergistic Selection with what Dawkins (1989/1976), following Hamilton, called
the “green beard effect”—preferential treatment toward an unrelated individual
who happens to share a similar trait. This circumstance may be a facilitator, but we
believe the term synergistic selection should be confined to the consequences of
synergistic functional interactions – say, collective defense of a nest or coordinated
hunting – where selectively-relevant synergies are jointly produced by the
participants.
16 In Unto Others and elsewhere, Wilson has also championed the idea of multi-
level selection and has argued for viewing human evolution as a process that has
involved human groups as “adaptive units.” (See especially Wilson, 2006; also
Wilson and Wilson, 2007, 2008). Wilson also drew our attention to the paradox –
(footnote continued)
first pointed out by Maynard Smith’s revered and feared mentor, Haldane (1932) –
that within-group altruism may serve to increase an altruist’s absolute reproduc-
tive fitness even as it might reduce its fitness relative to other group members.
17 However, we do have some disagreements with his interpretation of the role of
synergy. Michod assumes synergistic relationships are cost free. We believe this is
seldom the case; a favorable cost-benefit ratio is far more common. He also
assumes that synergistic selection can occur only if there are heritable variants
available, but in many situations the selective differences in fitness are binary—
between cooperators and non-cooperators. Lichen symbioses, which can some-
times be facultative, provide an example. By the same token, a selective difference
might be measured in relation to the bioeconomic payoffs—say, the interactions
between a group of predators and their prey. Michod also assumes that there must
be specialization among the members of any “higher level” group. This is very often
the case (certainly in the major transitions), but it is not universally true. For
instance, collective behaviors such as mobbing or joint defense of a nest-site may
produce a “synergy of scale”with “public goods.” Volvox provide a striking example.
In nature, these planktonic green algae are subject to predation from filter feeders
like the ubiquitous copepods, but there is an upper limit to the prey size these
organisms can consume. So the largest, multicellular Volvox colonies are virtually
immune from copepod predation (Bell, 1985). (Queller, 1997, referred to it as an
“economy of scale.”)
18 Nowak and his colleagues argue that “a group can be pulled together
[whenever] cooperation among unrelated members proves beneficial to them,
whether by simple reciprocity or by mutualistic synergism, or manipulation….
Relatedness is better explained as a consequence rather than a cause of sociality.” In
his 2013 book, E.O. Wilson elaborates on this point at some length.
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that “there is a more general, but still very realistic class of models
with synergies, for which it is not possible to summarize their
predictions on the basis of an evaluation of inclusive fitness.” And
Clutton-Brock (2009) addresses the issue of cooperation among non-
kin and sees mutual benefits (synergies) as more important than
strict reciprocities. He notes, “In some cases, cooperation generates
immediate synergistic benefits shared by cooperators that exceed the
costs of providing assistance.” He also cites several examples.
Synergy also figures in the comparative economics framework of
Vermeij (2009), while Bonsall (2010) discusses synergism in various
host-plant pathogen interactions. Social scientists Price and Johnson
(2011) highlight the role of synergistic cooperation in human groups.
Ohtsuki (2012) examines the role of synergies in various Prisoners’
Dilemma games. Purcell et al. (2012) argue that synergistic benefits
can expand the conditions for the occurrence of sociality. And Taylor
(2013) analyzes synergistic effects in graph-structured populations.
Especially significant is the accumulating evidence for syner-
gistic effects at the molecular and cellular levels. For instance,
microbiologist Shapiro (2012), in his book, Evolution: A View from
the 21st Century, focuses on what he characterizes as “natural
genetic engineering ” and notes that, “Most of the interactions
between biomolecules tend to be relatively weak and need multi-
ple synergistic attachments to produce stable functional com-
plexes….the synergistic nature of most molecular complexes pro-
vides dynamism and flexibility to the transcriptional machinery
[in the genome]…(p. 31). Later on Shapiro stresses again the
importance of cooperative, synergistic interactions. “The need for
cooperativity arises because many biomechanical interactions are
either weak or transitory, and multiple synergistic events stabilize
the formation of functional complexes for carrying out cellular
tasks…” (p. 131). (It is also important to stress that synergies
within individuals may or may not elicit such effects between
individuals. In other words, there may or may not be a correlation
of synergistic effects within and between interactors.)
Synergy is also invoked by the neurobiologist/anthropologist
Terrence Deacon in his Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from
Matter (Deacon, 2012). He assigns a key role to synergistic effects in
the origin of life and the emergence of purposeful, teleonomic
systems, culminating in the human mind. Deacon concludes, “On
reflection, we can now see that ‘life’s several powers’ [a quote from
Darwin] include and depend on the underlying morphogenetic
processes that synergistically support and generate one another”
(p. 462). Deacon uses variations on the term “synergy” no less than
51 times in his volume.
Finally, it is noteworthy that David Sumpter deployed the
concept of synergy extensively as an explanatory concept (and
model) in his comprehensive study, Collective Animal Behavior
(Sumpter, 2010). Sumpter addresses collective behaviors across a
broad range of species and behaviors, from migration to food
acquisition, information sharing, decision making, collective def-
ense, and risk sharing, and he focuses especially on the relati-
onship between mechanisms and their functions. Equally impor-
tant, he utilizes his own and others’ game theory models to
analyze in detail the relationship between costs and benefits,
and the functional consequences of cooperation or defection.
10. Conclusion
We think it fair to say that synergy is an idea whose time has
come. Perhaps, therefore, the synergism hypothesis will come to be
recognized as a plausible Darwinian theory of complexity in evolu-
tion, while the concept of synergistic selection may serve to help
build a bridge between a selectionist theoretical framework and the
many-faceted causal role that functional synergy has played in the
rise of cooperation and complexity in living systems over time.
Ratnieks (2006), p. 1413, commenting on a “target” theoretical
article about cooperation in the Journal of Evolutionary Biology
(Lehmann and Keller, 2006) in which the authors alluded in
passing to the role of synergy, summed it up as follows:
The condition under which cooperative helping is favoured by
natural selection is simply the condition under which most traits
are favoured by natural selection: greater reproductive success…
However, this does not mean that there are no biological puzzles
in understanding cooperation, or that the problems to be solved
are trivial. For example, we still need to know how synergisms
occur when individuals help each other. That is, how does
cooperation enlarge the cake and how does it get shared…rather
than monopolized? In my opinion, the answer to this problemwill
not be an all-encompassing condition arising out of a theoretical
breakthrough, but a multitude of biological situations and idio-
syncrasies that lead to the necessary synergy and sharing.
There is a story attributed to the famed twentieth century
philosopher Bertrand Russell about a public lecture in which he
discussed various properties of the Solar System. At the end of his
lecture, an elderly woman in the audience approached him and told
him he was wrong. The sun is held up on a turtle’s back, she said. A
startled Russell responded by asking her, so what holds up the turtle?
“You think you’re so clever,” she replied. “It’s turtles all the way down.”
So what explains the rise of complexity in evolution? From the
perspective of the synergism hypothesis and synergistic selection,
it’s synergies all the way up.
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